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Abstract
I discuss Prawitz’s claim that a non-reliabilist answer to the question “What is a
proof?” compels us to reject the standard Bolzano-Tarski account of validity, and
to account for the meaning of a sentence in broadly verificationist terms. I sketch
what I take to be a possible way of resisting Prawitz’s claim—one that concedes
the anti-reliabilist assumption from which Prawitz’s argument proceeds.
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What is a proof? Professor Prawitz’s paper has two aims: to show that this is a
hard and important question, and to suggest a possible answer—one, he argues, that
requires us to reject the standard Bolzano-Tarski account of validity, and to account
for the meaning of a sentence in terms of the grounds for asserting it. Section 1-3
attempt to resist Prawitz’s attack to the standard conceptions of meaning and validity.
Section 4 briefly raises three potential worries about Prawitz’s preferred answer to
our initial question. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
1 Legitimate inferences and knowledge of validity
The following definition of a proof may seem initially promising: a proof is a chain of
inferences that is seen to be valid. The question arises, though, as to which inferences
can legitimately figure in a proof. Prawitz suggests that only legitimate inferences can,
where an inference I is legitimate just if by making I a subject who has a justification
for the premises gets a justification for the conclusion.
To be sure, not all inferences are legitimate in this sense: only the ones that are
known to be valid—Prawitz assumes—are. However, he argues, on pain of starting an
infinite regress, knowledge of legitimate inferences must be ultimately non-inferential,
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i.e. it “must either be self-evident somehow, presumably in virtue of the meaning of
the sentences involved, or be implicit in some sense that would have to be explained”
(p. 6).1,2 And, Prawitz continues, whether we can make sense of either of these two
options depends on what one means by ‘valid’. More precisely, if validity is to be
known non-inferentially, the validity of an inference may not be explicated, as the
Bolzano-Tarski tradition would have it, as truth-preservation for all variations of the
meaning of the non-logical vocabulary. Prawitz concedes that, on the Bolzano-Tarski
account, a rule like ∧-I may be non-inferentially or implicitly known to be valid,
provided that we know ∧’s meaning, viz. that, for every valuation v, A ∧ B is true at
v just if A is true at v and B is true at v, and that we know that an inference is valid
just if it preserves truth at every valuation. But, he argues, for more complicated
cases “we find that we cannot go from the meaning of the sentences given in terms
of truth-conditions to the validity of the inferences without a considerable amount
of reasoning on the meta-level” (p. 7). If validity is to be accounted for the standard
way, Prawitz concludes, “we cannot require that a subject should know the validity
of an inference before she can use it in a proof (Ibid.)”.
2 Moderate inferentialism
This conclusion, it seems to me, can be resisted. Ordinary speakers are typically
unaware of the logician’s explications of the informal notion of validity. Hence, it
does not seem plausible in the first place to require that they know—whether self-
evidently or implicitly—facts about validity (see also Pagin, ming, pp. 18-9). A more
plausible option would be to say that an inference I is legitimate if being disposed to
infer according to I is constitutive of our understanding of some of the expressions
figuring in I. Following Boghossian (2003), let us call this the meaning-entitlement
view:
(ME) By making I a subject S who has a justification for the premises gets a justifica-
tion for the conclusion if (roughly) S knows the meanings of the expressions in
virtue of which I is valid, i.e. S is disposed to infer according to I.
Two points are worth mentioning. First, this view does not require speakers to know
that inferences are valid. All they need to know is the meaning of (some of) the
expressions occurring in them—that is, if I is constitutive of E’s meaning, speakers
must be willing to infer according to I, in order for I to be legitimate. Second, ME is
compatible with the Bolzano-Tarski account of validity.
Let moderate inferentialism be the view that introduction and elimination rules
(thereafter, I- and E-rules respectively) determine the truth-conditions of the logi-
cal operators, on the assumption that these rules are truth-preserving, and that to
1Page references are to Prawitz (2010), except where otherwise stated.
2One might reject this disjunction, and and attempt to block the regress along broadly reliabilist
lines (see e.g. Rumfitt, 2008, pp. 62-3). Prawitz is aware of this option, but declares that he will not
take it into consideration. I shall too set it aside, for the sake of argument.
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understand a logical operator $ is to be willing to infer according to its I- and E-
rules.3 Following Hodes (2004) and MacFarlane (2005), moderate inferentialists may
distinguish between the sense of a logical constant, whose grasp is constituted by
a willingness to infer according to its basic introduction and elimination rules, and
its referent, e.g. the truth-function it denotes. Indeed, they may have independent
reasons for doing so. Classically, for instance, A ∨ B (“A or B”) and A ‡ B (“not both
A and B”) have the same truth-conditions. Yet, we may want to say, ‘∨’ and ‘‡’ differ
in some aspect of meaning (MacFarlane, 2005, § 6.2). Moderate inferentialists have
the resources to account for such a difference: ‘∨’ and ‘‡’ have different senses, which
are specified by their different I- and E-rules.
Closer to our present concerns, moderate inferentialists can take the truth-conditions
of the logical operators to select the class of admissible models—models in terms of
which validity can be defined in model-theoretic terms. Thus Vann McGee: “The
rules of inference determine truth-conditions. The truth-conditions together [. . . ]
determine the logical consequence relation” (McGee, 2000, p. 72).
3 Prawitz’s objections to inferentialism
Prawitz considers a response along similar lines, viz. that “the meaning of expressions
to be determined by inference rules that govern their use” (p. 10). He examines two
versions of the view, and finds them both wanting.
On the first version, propounded by Gentzen and, indeed, Prawitz himself during
the 70’s and the 80’s, only I-rules are taken to be meaning constitutive—more precisely,
I-rules whose conclusion is logically more complex than any of the premises or of the
discharged hypotheses. Prawitz objects that, first, this approach delivers a “notion of
validity of an inference” which “gives no information concerning the question when
an inference is legitimate” (p. 10), and that, second, if we take only some inferences to
be meaning-constitutive, “it is unclear what makes the remaining ones legitimate” (p.
13).
Concerning the first objection, though, we have already seen that it is a mistake to
identify the legitimate inferences with the ones that are known to be valid, irrespective
of whether validity is accounted for in model- or proof-theoretic terms. As for the
second, the objection assumes that there are legitimate inferences that are legitimate
or entitling, but not meaning-constitutive. In some sense of the term ‘proof’, this may
well be. What counts as a proof for an exceedingly bright mathematician may not
be a proof for a high-school student. But, I take it, we are here trying to define an
idealized notion of a proof: one that could in principle be recognized by a competent
speaker. On this understanding of ‘proof’, I submit, the class of legitimate inferences
may well coincide with the meaning-constitutive ones.4
On the second approach, all “the immediate inferences accepted in a language”
3See e.g. Smiley (1996) and Garson (2010).
4To be sure, the question remains as to how, in our linguistic practice, speakers are entitled to make
inferences that are not meaning-constitutive. I do not have space to address this problem here. It is
worth noting, however, that it equally affects Prawitz’s view—see Pagin (ming, p. 19).
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are taken as meaning-constitutive, and “a person who knows the meanings of all the
expressions occurring in a [basic] inference also knows immediately that the inference
is valid, because to know these meanings is among other things to know that the
inference is valid in the language in question; no reasoning is required to establish the
validity” (p. 10). Prawitz’s main objection to this brand of inferentialism is essentially
Arthur Prior’s point that not all combinations of I- and E-rules can define a logical
expression, since some combinations give raise to inconsistency (see Prior, 1960).
There have been attempts to “find a restriction (other than the condition in terms of
complexity present in Gentzen’s approach), which imposed on the inference rules that
can be taken as meaning constitutive, would guarantee consistency”, but, Prawitz
writes, “these attempts have been fruitless” (pp. 12-3). They appeal to some notion
of harmony between I- and E-rules, where—roughly—a pair of I- and E-rules for an
operator $ is harmonious just if $-E allows us to infer from $-statements precisely what
follows from the grounds for introducing $-statements, as specified by $-I. However,
Prawitz observes, examples of harmonious and yet inconsistent rules have long been
known. For instance, consider the following pair of rules (first given by Stephen Read,
2000):
[•]i
...
⊥
•-I, i
•
• •
•-E .
⊥
These rules are as harmonious as one may wish them to be. Yet, it is easy to show
that, given the standard structural rules, they yield inconsistency.5,6
Prawitz’s dismissal of the inferentialist’s criteria for meaning-constitution seems
too quick. To begin with, it is difficult to see why a combination of restrictions
on admissible introduction rules, on the hand, and admissible combinations of I-
and E-rules, on the other, may not allow inferentialists to characterize a class of
meaning-constitutive rules, at least insofar as these rules are intended to define logical
expressions. Indeed, Gentzen’s restriction on admissible I-rules precisely points in
that direction. Secondly, inferentialists may follow Belnap (1962) and require that
admissible rules yield a conservative extension of the structural fragment of our
system.7 Trivializing operators, from Prior’s tonk to Read’s •, typically fail to meet
this requirement, pending some drastic revision of the structural rules.
5Prawitz (1965, p. 94) provides another example of harmonious and yet inconsistent rules.
6Prawitz concedes that, on this second approach, one might alternatively follow Cozzo (1994) and
take inconsistent (and indeed trivializing) rules to be meaning-constitutive. He persuasively argues,
though, that doing so would oblige us to treat as primitive rules that can be meaning-theoretically
justified.
7Not, nota bene, of the system as a whole. On the standard inferentialist accounts of higher-order
quantification, this would immediately rule out higher-order logics of level 3 and above (see Wright,
2007).
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4 Grounds
Now to Prawitz’s own proposal. Let a ground for a sentence A be whatever justifies
an assertion of A. Then, Prawitz tells us, A’s meaning is given by what counts as
a ground for A. If A is an atomic observational sentence, a ground for A is a set of
“relevant observations”. If A is a compound sentence, a ground for A is defined in
terms of the grounds for asserting A’s sub-sentences. For instance, if α and β are
grounds for, respectively, A and B, one can join these two grounds into a compound
ground for A ∧ B. Prawitz calls this operation conjunction introduction:
(∧-I) γ is a ground for A ∧ B just if γ = ∧i(α, β), where α is a ground for
A and β is a ground for B.
Grounds for assertions made under assumptions can be likewise defined by reference
to unsaturated grounds (p. 14). In short: grounds are operations that transform the
grounds for the premises of an inference into grounds for its conclusion. The upshot
is a somewhat richer notion of an inference rule:
An inference should be taken as being determined or individuated not only
by its premisses and conclusion [. . . ], but also by an operation applicable
to the given grounds for the premisses. (p. 17)
Indeed, Prawitz argues, an inference I is valid just when the operation it is associated
with yields a ground for the conclusion whenever we are given grounds for the
premises and we infer according to I. As a result, whenever wemake a valid inference,
we apply an operation to the premises which yields a ground for that inference’s
conclusion. Our initial question is finally answered: legitimate inferences are valid
inferences, and vice versa. As for proofs, they are spatio-temporally located “means for
finding a ground”. Two different proofs may deliver the same grounds. Grounds, we
must infer, are Platonic entities, outside of space and time.
I will limit myself to making three observations. First, if grounds are Platonic
objects, and if the grounds for observational sentences are “observations”, one won-
ders what these observations may be. They cannot be observations made by some
particular agent at some particular time, at least if different proofs, or justifications,
can sometimes deliver the same ground. They must therefore be rather akin to what
Austin called sensibilia—disembodied sense data.8 Now, Prawitz’s main reason for
(re)introducing sensibilia, is twofold: first, that only on the assumption that proofs
are delivered by objective grounds can proofs be independent of what we think is a
proof; and second, that only if grounds are atemporal can truth also be atemporal.
Here I limit myself to noticing that Prawitz’s second reason essentially depends on
his verificationism, viz. that a sentence A is true just if there is—in an atemporal sense
of ‘is’—a ground for A.
Second, the operations on grounds Prawitz considers all validate I-rules satisfying
Gentzen’s complexity requirement. However, consider the following operation on
grounds:
8Thanks to Tim Williamson here.
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(•-I) γ is a ground for • just if γ = (•iξ)β(ξ), where β(ξ) is some unsatu-
rated ground for asserting ⊥ under the assumption •.
This operation, if it exists, validates the infamous •-I. Hence, just as inferentialists are
faced with the problem of defining admissible I-rules, Prawitz may need to tell us
which operations on grounds are admissible, and why.
Finally, in order to avoid a holistic view of meaning, verificationists need to specify
what counts as a canonical ground for a sentence A, on the assumption that either
the non-canonical grounds for A can be reduced to its canonical grounds, or a grasp
of what counts as a non-canonical ground is not part of one’s understanding of A,
irrespective of whether non-canonical grounds can be reduced to the canonical ones.
Elsewhere, Prawitz states a clear preference for the first option. It is unclear, however,
whether this option—Dummett’s so-called Fundamental Assumption—can be plausibly
maintained for atomic sentences. Yet, as Prawitz himself acknowledges,
it is the whole verificationist project that is in danger when the fundamen-
tal assumption cannot be upheld. (Prawitz, 2006, p. 523)
By contrast, the problem need not affect moderate inferentialists, at least insofar as
they do not identify the sense of a sentence with what counts as a (canonical) ground
for asserting it.
5 Conclusions
In Prawitz’s view, proofs are chains of legitimate inferences—inferences that, when
made, yield a justification for the conclusion if we have a justification for the premises.
However, Prawitz argues, making sense of legitimate inferences has drastic conse-
quences in the philosophy of logic, viz. it forces us to reject the Bolzano-Tarski account
of validity. Moderate inferentialists, I have suggested, can resist this conclusion, pace
Prawitz’s general reservations about inferentialism. As for Prawitz’s suggestion that
rules are associated with validity-making operations on Platonic grounds, it seems to
me that it faces the same problems besetting the inferentialist approach, with some
additional worries concerning the metaphysics of grounds.
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